Monday, November 06, 2006


Where Is America Going?
BY JAMES LILEKS


It's just a midterm election. It's not the end of the world. That comes later, if the wrong side wins.

Or not. Depends. Much of the world's fate is out of the hands of Congress, believe it or not. If Republicans keep the House of Representatives, you won't see newly energized congressmen leading a secret team to destroy Iranian nukes. If the Democrats win, it's doubtful al-Qaida will melt away. (A 25-seat majority? We had expected twice that! All is lost!)

The Democrats could spend two fruitful, productive years trying to impeach the president and cut off funding to the troops. A Republican majority could spent 24 months spending, dithering, blathering and back-slapping. And 2008 will roll around with the same passions, the same divisions and the same big question:

Where are we going, exactly?

Every era asks the same question in the same fretful spirit. Even the golden ages that now seem to brim with rude gusto had their doubts. Postwar America, for example, looks full of chest-thumping brio from the distance of 60 years: We beat Hitler! Let's all buy dishwashers! But the Red Threat loomed abroad, and there was a growing suspicion that Negroes would no longer be content with "porter" held out as the highest job to which they might aspire.

Pick any era, and you'll find doubt and worry about the world we leave to our children -- if it's not women demanding the right to vote and smoke, it's perpetual stagflation and global cooling.

Somehow we muddle through. The muddling seems tougher now because of those Deep National Divisions you hear about daily, like Coke vs. Pepsi. Mutual distrust has never been greater. The left believes the right would build Heathen Conversion Processing Centers in every state if it could. The right believes the left wants to declare the Boy Scouts a hate group if they don't offer a merit badge for presiding over a gay marriage.

Boil it all down, though, and you get two different views of the future that differ from the sort of disputation we've had before. One is based in the virtues America held in the past: hard-workin', church-goin', gummint outta my hair. The other is based in the virtues Europe displays today: the warm bath of socialism, the bromides of multiculturalism, the distaste for nationalism, and an icky-icky revulsion toward landing a fist on the jaw of the barbarians.

If the left gains power again, it had best seek its roots in the virtues the right has professed, because the example the left loves fares poorly. The end result of European multiculturalism is the burned bus in a Paris suburb; the end result of European socialism is structural unemployment, the dole, and the belief that an eight-week vacation walking around a Spanish beach in a Speedo is a natural right of man; the end result of European secularism is empty churches, shrinking populations and the sincere belief that the culture of resurgent Islam can be mollified by writing a check and assuming the fetal position.

The end result of European experience with war is a defense apparatus that couldn't fight Operation Paper Bag; the end result of European nationalism is the belief that bureaucrats in Belgium must be vested with the power to regulate cheese. It's quite lovely, except when it has to defend itself or stand for something.

The end result is a population that regards the theoretical possibility of polar bears dropping through thin ice as a greater threat to humanism than an Iranian bomb dropping on Tel Aviv. If the EU decreed that for the sake of Gaia the living Earth, crematoria should be used to decrease the surplus population, they wouldn't have to shove people on the trains; millions of enervated Europeans would clamber aboard as volunteers. Save the bears!

It takes concerted effort over time to reshape a culture, and in this sense we're way behind. One midterm election won't change the world. As Europe has shown us, it takes 40 years to sap a culture of its strength and self-confidence. On the other hand, we have their good example; we could probably cut that down to 20.

Nov. 1, 2006

From The Philadelphia Inquirer:

In 'Echo Park,' you're there, cracking the case

Echo Park
By Michael Connelly

Little, Brown. 416 pp. $26.99

Reviewed by David J. Montgomery


Ever since the publication of his first novel, The Black Echo, in 1992, Michael Connelly has produced some of the finest work the mystery genre has seen - novels of distinction that not only succeed as rousing stories of suspense and intrigue, but that also form a virtual biography of a city, a social history of Los Angeles as seen through the ideas of a simple, yet extraordinary man.

Through the years of O.J. and the riots, the ups and downs of the Dodgers and Lakers, the Northridge Quake and the Night Stalker, the story of Detective Harry Bosch has unfolded against the backdrop of this magical, but troubled city. During that time, Bosch has developed into one of the richest and most compelling characters in crime fiction - or any fiction, for that matter.

Bosch is a man defined by his contrasts, who brings answers to others, but is constantly plagued by doubt. A public servant insubordinate to the establishment, yet fiercely loyal to the victims of crime. A detective who helps others find peace, but who knows nothing in this life but trouble.

For the 12th novel in the Bosch series, Connelly has chosen a name - Echo Park - that is evocative of the series' opener, and in many ways we can see the detective coming full circle. He is back working for the LAPD's elite Robbery-Homicide division, tracking down "cold cases," crimes that have lingered unsolved, often for many years.

Bosch has also once again found romance with a female FBI agent, a relationship that has little more chance for success than his prior liaison with an agent more than a decade earlier. That previous romance brought marriage and parenthood, but wife and child are gone now, living halfway around the world. Bosch once again is alone.

His personal life remains a vacuum, cold and empty, the only fire inside him burning for his mission, the one thing that keeps bringing him back from the abyss. Bosch has dedicated himself to speaking for the dead, giving a voice to those who no longer have one, and bringing their killers to justice.

One of those victims has lingered in his thoughts for more than a decade: a young woman whose murder he originally investigated but could not solve. Now it appears that the killer has been caught, and he's ready to admit to everything as part of a plea bargain to escape the death penalty. Bosch finds no closure in this trade-off, and suspects that the confession is as hollow as the deal.

As he starts to pluck at the strings holding the case together, Bosch learns more and more about what is really going on. He eventually learns more than he wanted to know when he uncovers a crucial clue that he missed all of those years before, a clue that might have led to an arrest that would have saved several lives.

As is the case with all of Connelly's work, the plot is exquisitely drawn, a finely wrought and intricate story of detection and police procedure that is so good it would almost make you think that the author was right there in the car with the detectives.

Along with plot, Connelly also excels at creating a taut and engrossing narrative, telling his story in simple, but compelling fashion. He leaves the narrative unadorned, never indulging in verbose language or flowery prose. Even so, his writing never fails to paint a full and lush picture, both of the story's setting and its characters.

It is in those two areas, in particular, that this writer's work truly shines. No one has ever written about the city of Los Angeles with as sharp yet loving an eye as this former journalist does. And it is through the eyes of his characters, particularly the immortal Harry Bosch, that he unveils this rich tapestry. Among contemporary crime writers, Connelly is, quite simply, the best of the best.

David J. Montgomery is the editor of Mystery Ink (www.mysteryinkonline.com).

The Lieberman question
By William F. Buckley


Monday, November 6, 2006

A newsman pressed me a couple of days ago on the matter of the Senate election in Connecticut. Whom would I vote for? That's an improper question, as we all know: that's why voting is done in private. But I had been noisy on the subject of Joe Lieberman and could hardly, at this moment, plead the superordination of privacy. So I said, "Lieberman." And he said, Why? And I said, "I like Lieberman," and politely declined amplification.

Years ago I argued in favor of Al Lowenstein, a prominent New York liberal, for Congress, and received the same bemused interrogation from the press. On that occasion I said simply that I was defying my principled opposition to many of Lowenstein's positions in order to vote for a human being I thought superior. On the matter of Lieberman, there is more there than a personal attraction to the individual. Republican candidate Alan Schlesinger commented on my choice, "I think it's ironic that anyone as conservative as Bill Buckley would help someone as liberal as Joe Lieberman." But Schlesinger misses the point.

The important contention next Tuesday doesn't involve the Republican candidate. It is Lieberman vs. Ned Lamont, the other Democrat. And the political drama in Connecticut isn't just among the candidates. It has to do with the future of the Democratic Party -- and that future affects everyone.

What happened in this campaign was the materialization on Aug. 8 of an ideological posse. Its mission was to punish a Democrat for the sin of backing President Bush in the Iraqi war.

Now it gets a little complicated because there are many Americans who oppose the war as it has evolved. If you promise not to tell anybody, my own conviction is that if George Bush ever took to the bottle again, he might confide that he wishes he had never got into war in Iraq. I too wish he hadn't, but that's not because he was wrong in going in. He was moved by a conviction that Saddam Hussein was productively engaged in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, that he was in league with a terrorist movement that threatened the Middle East, and that the United States needed to demonstrate its willingness to use its own resources to fight against incipient threats to regional and national security.

Joe Lieberman agreed. He was hardly the only Democrat to back Bush in 2003, but his special prominence -- he had, after all, been Al Gore's running mate in the campaign of 2000 -- attracted attention to his continued backing of Bush on foreign policy. The especially sibilant left set out to make the backing of Bush an excommunicable offense. So that when a pleasant and wealthy young man in Greenwich, Conn., volunteered to head up the posse, he got the backing of the Democratic left. And when the showdown came, the ideological avengers won the day. Lieberman was defeated in the Democratic primary.

This meant to the population at large that hard-bitten Democratic leftists were bidding for control of the party and had scored a huge victory in a critical exchange by defeating a three-term senator who once ran for vice president. The bigger they are ... the harder they fall. So there was much rejoicing in the Jacobin camp when Lieberman lost.

But of course almost immediately Lieberman announced that he would run as an independent. This gave the dissenters in Connecticut -- Democratic, Republican and independent -- an opportunity to vote against the execution of the prominent and effective incumbent, who has thought and acted in what he believed the national interest, never mind that the commander in chief was a Republican.

The features of the Democratic leadership are not yet set. The left is eager to assert itself as the true heir of the Democratic tradition, even as in 1948, under the leadership of Henry Wallace, the left attempted to take over the party of FDR and Harry Truman. It failed, and may fail again. But much depends on how much life there is in the opposition, and the first challenge is to vote to retain Joe Lieberman in office.


From The Weekly Standard:
The Borat Show
The man who would be Kazakhstan's man of the moment.
by John Podhoretz

10/30/2006

Borat: Cultural Learnings
of America for Make
Benefit Glorious
Nation of Kazakhstan
Directed by Larry Charles


A cheap-looking and extremely strange movie with an even stranger title--Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan--is opening in a few weeks, and it will make a sensation. Columnists will write op-eds about it. Talking heads will try to dissect it on chat shows. Already, several months before its release, two rather dissimilar institutions--the government of Kazakhstan and the Anti-Defamation League--have issued statements of concern about Borat's potential to do harm.

Ham-handed responses like those just play into the glorious and very tough-minded comic sensibility that animates Borat. This movie is satire in its truest, most courageous, form. Oxen are gored right and left. America is savaged. The Third World is savaged. Feminists are savaged. Evangelical Christian tent shows are savaged. Frat boys are savaged. Political correctness is savaged. The attitude that says political correctness is humorless twaddle is savaged. This is one of the four or five funniest movies ever made.

The movie follows Borat Sagdiyev, a news reporter for Kazakh television, as he journeys from his small village to the United States and travels around making a documentary intended to explain America to his countrymen. Borat isn't real. He's a character invented and portrayed by the British comic actor Sacha Baron Cohen. But most of the people in the movie are everyday Americans who have no idea Borat is a fictional character being played by a British comedian. They believe there is an actual Borat Sagdiyev and that they are being filmed for his documentary.

Cohen pioneered this form of kamikaze interviewing with his character Ali G. Cohen's producers would call up celebrities and politicians in Britain (and later here) and ask if they would be interviewed by a young journalist from the BBC or HBO. They would agree, and then find themselves face to face with a tall white Rasta doofus asking them the dumbest questions ever devised. The comedy came not from Ali G's dense queries but from the reactions of the celebrities and politicians, who could not believe what they were hearing and yet had to stay cool and collected because they knew cameras were rolling.

When Cohen created Borat, he took this brilliant concept to a new level. For while Ali G is just a well-meaning idiot, Borat is something else entirely. He's cheerful, friendly, and outgoing. He is also a crazed anti-Semite, racist, and misogynist--not because he's chosen to be these things but because everybody he has ever known shares the same prejudices. When Borat interacts with Americans, he presumes they believe what he believes. Most don't, and watching them react with growing horror and disbelief at Borat's grotesque beliefs is hilarious. It's even more hilarious--and discomfiting, as true satire should be--when Borat finds secret allies in the American heartland.

The genius of Borat is that it works on you in all sorts of different ways. In one sense, it's a raunchy comedy in the tradition of Animal House whose highlight is a crazed and enraged wrestling match between Borat and his obese producer. They wrestle in a hotel room, then in the hallway, then in the elevator, then through the lobby and into a ballroom where an actual, real-world convention is having its annual dinner. The wrestling is wild, violent, cartoonish--and both men are naked. The sequence is a classic piece of slapstick--as indelible in its way as the Marx Brothers' stateroom scene in A Night at the Opera 70 years ago.

Like Chico Marx, Cohen is an old-time dialect comedian, and Borat mines its title character's mangled English for everything it's worth. But here again Cohen and his collaborators take things a step further. If you listen carefully you will discover that when Borat speaks Kazakh, he is actually speaking a combination of Slavic-sounding nonsense and conversational Hebrew. (Cohen's mother is Israeli.)

Which brings us to the central question about Borat: What are we to make of its title character's happy, chatty, and thoroughgoing Jew-hatred? The character, which debuted on Cohen's Ali G show on HBO, first came to prominence with Borat appearing at an open-mike night at a redneck bar, singing a catchy little ditty he had composed called "Throw the Jew Down the Well." In the movie, we learn that the highlight of the year in Borat's Kazakh village is a festival called "The Running of the Jew." Borat and his producer come to America but refuse to fly across the country because they are afraid the Jews might be planning "to restage their attack of 9/11." And in the film's most headspinning scene, Borat books a room in a real bed-and-breakfast run by a Jewish family in Pennsylvania, and spends the night in a state of abject terror, sure the mild and lovely couple are planning to poison him, steal his money, and drain his blood.

The answer to the central question is, of course, that Borat is a satire of anti-Semitism--a riposte and retort to it in every conceivable way. The film's first director, Todd Phillips, quit halfway through because he was certain Borat needed a character who would argue with Borat and challenge his opinions. Cohen refused to sugarcoat his portrait of this global idiocy by offering an audience stand-in to tell Borat it's not nice to say the Jews caused 9/11. (The credited director is Larry Charles, who also helms most of the episodes of Curb Your Enthusiasm.)

When Jonathan Swift recommended cannibalizing children as a solution to the problem of Irish hunger in "A Modest Proposal," the greatest work of political satire in English, he did not explain that he was being facetious--and the humorless solons of his time screamed in horror. Sacha Baron Cohen is no Jonathan Swift, of course. But he's as close as we're likely to come on the silver screen in 2006, and we're lucky to have him.

John Podhoretz is THE WEEKLY STANDARD's movie critic.

From The American Conservative:
GOP and Man at Yale

The intellectual dexterity that once distinguished campus conservatives has given way to mindless Republican boosterism.

by Daniel McCarthy

James R. Lawrence III doesn’t look like a campus misfit. The North Carolina State University senior has the kind of clean-cut, buttoned-down appearance one expects of a major in biomedical engineering, a field whose academic rigors leave little room for an “Animal House” or Abbie Hoffman way of life. But Lawrence is more unusual than his demeanor might suggest. He’s distinctly in the minority of a minority, as both a campus conservative and one who’s against the Iraq War.

In the eyes of some of his friends on the Right, that makes Lawrence really a kind of leftist. When he published an editorial for the anniversary of Hiroshima criticizing Harry Truman’s use of nuclear weapons against Japan, one of his colleagues on the campus conservative paper, The Broadside, suggested he was its “token liberal.” That isn’t surprising—student conservatives across the country tend to resent any suggestion that U.S. foreign policy could be immoral. But it is ironic, considering that one of the classic texts of postwar conservatism, Richard M. Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences, was written in response to the horrors of the Second World War, including America’s use of nuclear weapons. “The atomic bomb was a final blow to the code of humanity,” Weaver wrote to a friend in 1945.

Lawrence cited Weaver and Human Events founding editor Felix Morley in his article, but that counted for little. The young men and women of the Right aren’t reading much Richard Weaver these days—nor much Robert Nisbet or Russell Kirk, to name two other seminal conservative thinkers critical of modern warfare. The time when Young Americans for Freedom wore badges blazoned with the slogan “Don’t Immanentize the Eschaton” has long passed. Now College Republicans parade in shirts proclaiming “George W. Bush Is My Homeboy.” The campus Right has almost always been more activist than intellectual, just as the wider movement has been more political than cultural. But where once students were at least familiar with the names Kirk and Weaver, or Mises and Nock, today they look to Sean Hannity and Ann Coulter for guidance. They’re little acquainted with the wisdom of the contemporary Right’s founding generation, and it shows.

Campus conservatives are not just the future of the movement, they are its present as well. Alumni of the major right-wing youth organizations fill the ranks, and hold the commanding heights, of the institutions that mold conservative orthodoxy today. American Conservative Union Chairman David Keene is a former national director of Young Americans for Freedom. Ann Coulter and National Review editor Rich Lowry are veterans of student papers affiliated with the Collegiate Network, the breeder reactor of conservative campus journalism. Karl Rove and Jack Abramoff launched their political careers as leaders of the College Republicans National Committee, as did Grover Norquist and Ralph Reed.

Reed might not like the look of today’s conservative students. Journalists left and right have remarked upon how little they resemble the young Republicans of old; “there are plenty of ragged T-shirts, backward baseball caps and frayed jeans” among them, according to the New York Times Magazine, as well as the occasional instance of “full goth regalia.” The Times labels them “Hipublicans.” City Journal’s Brian Anderson calls them “South Park Conservatives” and notes they differ from Ralph Reed on more than just sartorial questions: “For most of the conservative students I interviewed, traditional values did not extend to homosexuality— most are okay with state-sanctioned civil unions for gays.” But that’s a reflection of the mores of their generation rather than a sign of philosophical libertarianism, which appears to command as few Hipublican adherents as Kirkian conservatism does. “We have to use any and all means to defend ourselves from the terrorists, who hate the American way of life even more than the French and Germans do,” one “mildly libertarian” Cornell student told Anderson.

The odd nose ring or purple Mohawk notwithstanding, these students are best understood not as Hipublicans or South Park Conservatives but as something altogether more prosaic—College Republicans. With over a quarter of a million members and chapters on nearly 1,200 campuses, the College Republicans are the superpower of the student Right. No other organization has comparable reach or influence, though a few nonpartisan conservative groups, such as the Leadership Institute and Intercollegiate Studies Institute, do have campus affiliates. The predominance of the CRs predictably gives college conservatism a partisan slant—a CR chapter is an unlikely place to find criticism of Bush from the Right. What’s more, the CRs naturally put a low premium on encouraging students to read the canon of intellectual conservatism—whose works, after all, are more concerned with history, literature, and philosophy than with practical politics. From the point of view of a campus activist, “Why should I spend my time reading about Albert Jay Nock or Irving Babbitt, when I could be out changing the world?” asks Emporia State University Professor Gregory Schneider, a historian of the conservative youth movement.

Promoting the party’s candidates and officeholders—and, by extension, their policies—is the College Republicans’ raison d’etre. For most CR chapters that entails steadfast support for the Iraq War. To coincide with the president’s State of the Union address in January, the College Republicans National Committee organized “Finish the Job! Support Our Troops!” rallies on 130 campuses and in Washington. Pro-war and pro-administration lecturers like John Ashcroft and David Horowitz are among the most popular CR-sponsored campus speakers. Horowitz’s hawkish arguments made an especially strong impression on students attending the CR national convention last year. “This isn’t an invasion of Iraq, it’s a liberation—as David Horowitz said,” one attendee insisted to Nation reporter Max Blumenthal.

So gung-ho are the CRs for liberating Iraq, their enthusiasm sometimes crosses party lines: in July, the Princeton College Republicans offered members a chance to campaign for pro-war Sen. Joseph Lieberman in his Democratic primary fight against Ned Lamont. Yet there are at least a handful of antiwar CRs scattered across the country. James Lawrence was one; he learned the Broadside was looking for a new editor from an e-mail sent through the NC State CR list. Joseph Grigoletti, a sophomore at the University of Illinois-Springfield, is another. Like Lawrence, he’s been called a “left-wing loony” by other conservative students for his views on war. “Most College Republicans,” he says, “have never heard of Richard Weaver or Russell Kirk.”

There was a time, before the College Republicans became the biggest and often the only conservative group on campus, when students on the Right could be expected to know who Kirk and Weaver were. Young Americans for Freedom, the pre-eminent conservative youth adjunct of the Goldwater and Vietnam eras, was activist in orientation. But it included an intellectual component strong enough that members could identify the brands of conservatism to which they subscribed with such figures as Kirk, Ludwig von Mises, Ayn Rand, and Frank Meyer. And even earlier, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, the first national conservative student organization, unabashedly emphasized ideas over politics.

In a sense the modern Right began as a youth movement in the person of William F. Buckley Jr. When the 26-year-old Buckley published God and Man at Yale in 1951, the pre-war Old Right was very old indeed. Its spiritual exemplar, Albert Jay Nock, had died six years before. Frank Chodorov, evangelist of Nock’s gospel, was 64 and within a decade would suffer a career-ending stroke, a fate that had already befallen H.L. Mencken. These cantankerous individualists were neither a movement nor, arguably, conservative. But they were the vanguard of opposition to the welfare state—and the warfare state, too. By the ‘50s, their tradition was in need of a new voice. With Buckley, whose book called for Yale to purge its Keynesians and fellow travelers and whose father had been an ardent America Firster, it seemed to have found one.

Buckley became the axis around which newly devised conservative institutions could spin. One of the first of these was the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, conceived by Frank Chodorov in the early 1950s as an alternative to influence Intercollegiate Socialist Society founded by Jack London. Chodorov invited Buckley to become titular head of this effort, which would establish a lecture bureau—at first, just Chodorov and Buckley—and distribute literature extolling economic individualism. A third organizer, 29-year-old E. Victor Milione, a Roman Catholic (like Buckley) whose thinking had been informed by Jacob Burckhardt, would bring to ISI an increasingly traditionalist emphasis.

Within a decade, some 30,000 students had been involved with ISI. By design, the organization appealed to a self-selective elite, of whom “nothing is required … other than that they read the literature,” Chodorov wrote. “Among the books ISI distributed to students, free of charge or for a minimal fee,” Gregory Schneider notes in Cadres for Conservatism, “were Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, Felix Morley’s Freedom and Federalism, Richard Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences, and Buckley’s and Brent Bozell’s McCarthy and His Enemies.” Chodorov hoped that through ISI, “the individualist would become the campus radical, just as the socialist was forty years ago, and the halo of intellectualism would descend on his brow.”

Yet for all of ISI’s success, another group would become the face of the campus Right in the 1960s. Once again, Buckley was present at the creation: the organizational meeting for Young Americans for Freedom was held at his family home in Sharon, Connecticut over Sept. 10-11, 1960. The gathering brought together students and young activists from a plethora of other organizations, including ISI and the Young Republicans, at the instigation of Doug Caddy—who as a Georgetown University School of Foreign Service student had created the nationwide Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath with George Washington University student David Franke—and fundraising guru Marvin Liebman. YAF was to be an activist group, an explicitly conservative alternative to the Young Republicans then dominated by their Nelson Rockefeller wing. Out of the meeting came not only YAF but also the Sharon Statement, a credo for the group drafted by M. Stanton Evans, 27-year-old editor of the Indianapolis News. The Sharon Statement was an early example of Cold War conservative orthodoxy, combining staunch anticommunism with the economics of classical liberalism.

Early YAFers took their ideas and principles seriously. So much so that from the beginning there was tension between YAF’s anticommunist and traditionalist side and its libertarians. The word “God” only made it into the Sharon Statement by a narrow vote of 40-44. Before long, the New Individualist Review, a libertarian student journal at the University of Chicago, was questioning the military measures implied in the Sharon Statement’s anticommunism. From the other direction, traditionalist Notre Dame Professor Gerhart Niemeyer objected to the document’s classical liberalism, which he believed, “divorced the public order form the historical world of Western culture, positive law from natural law, political theory from religion.” But for almost a decade, the center held: membership soared, chapters proliferated, and YAF played a crucial role in securing the 1964 Republican presidential nomination for Barry Goldwater.

War in Vietnam and the campus unrest accompanying it finally drove a wedge between YAF’s conservatives and radical libertarians. The battle of ideas that simmered in YAF’s early years became a battle of fists at the organization’s 1969 convention in St. Louis, where bedlam erupted when a libertarian student burned his draft card—or rather, a convincing facsimile—on the convention floor. Fusionism became fission as the radical libertarians split from YAF. Some YAF chapters switched affiliation to the newly formed Students for Individual Liberty or the California Libertarian Alliance. Yet YAF’s dwindling momentum and membership in the ‘70s owed less to the libertarian schism than to the decline of campus activism in general, according to Gregory Schneider. And as the conservative movement became institutionalized in Washington, YAF increasingly came to resemble the College Republicans. There was room in the movement for only one youth adjunct to the GOP, and it wouldn’t be YAF.

Then as now, there were few outright antiwar conservatives—as opposed to libertarians—on campuses. All along, YAF had been supportive of the Vietnam effort. The student Right of the ‘60s was well-read compared to the Sean Hannity generation, but what it had been reading was National Review, whose steady broadsides against the antiwar Left were more than enough to compensate for any doubts the works of Richard Weaver might have sown. (Weaver himself died in ’63, too soon to address the conflict in Indochina.) The Kennan-esque realist conservatism of Robert Nisbet and John Lukacs, meanwhile, was still developing; neither man’s stature as a giant of the postwar Right was yet indisputable. As for the anti-interventionist Old Right, it “was pretty much forgotten,” according to Schneider. “There wasn’t really this sense that Albert Jay Nock or John T. Flynn had any bearing on [YAF’s] thought at all.”

One exception was David Franke. “He told me that one of the things that drew him to conservatism was John T. Flynn,” Schneider relates. Franke didn’t oppose the war, but he did come out against the draft in 1967, and as editor of YAF’s journal, New Guard, he commissioned anti-conscription essays from libertarians and traditionalists alike, including Russell Kirk. He won over the group’s national board: at the ’69 convention, although a radical libertarian proposal to support draft resistance was defeated, YAF did endorse a call to end conscription. But the draft was a separate issue from the war, however intimately linked they were. Franke later stated what, more than anything, sustained conservative students’ support for the fight: “Because SDS and the Leftists were against the war in Vietnam, [Lyndon Johnson] effectively got Republicans and conservatives to back him in waging it.”

Much the same holds true today for the war in Iraq, according to Daniel Flynn, author of Why the Left Hates America and a man of wide acquaintance with the student Right as a campus lecturer and former organizer with Accuracy in Academia and the Leadership Institute. Flynn himself is a critic of President Bush’s foreign policy: “I gave a speech the night the war broke out, at St. John’s College in Minnesota. In pretty much every speech I’ve given since then I’d mention my opposition to the war in Iraq.” In his experience, the campus Right is overwhelmingly pro-war because “it’s anti-Left.” Moreover, “students are coming into the conservative movement without the intellectual grounding, with no real basis for disagreeing with popular politicians” like President Bush.

In making his case against the Iraq War to conservative students, Flynn argues that “it wasn’t a liberal/conservative issue,” pointing to antiwar conservatives and pro-war liberals. He also recommends re-examining conservative principles: “I would look back to the Sharon Statement”—with its emphasis on “America’s just interests”—“as a clear and succinct statement of what the conservative attitude to foreign affairs is.” But Flynn doubts whether the canon of intellectual conservatism provides much guidance for today’s foreign policy: “The present historical situation is new. Even 20 years ago, no one would have thought of having these humanitarian interventions. If you’re looking back to Kirk and Nisbet, I don’t think you’re going to find a whole lot. It wasn’t an issue because there was little demand for intervention from the Left or the Right.”

Yet it can be surprising just how much effect reading Russell Kirk, for example, can have on students’ ideas about war and foreign policy. The New York Times provided a case in point on July 31, in a story reporting on a Kirk seminar organized by Young America’s Foundation, a student-oriented conservative nonprofit. The piece suggests both the relevance and ambivalence of the canon. One student, University of Baltimore senior Ann Lightle, concluded from her reading of Kirk’s Korean War-era work The American Cause that the Iraq War was indeed grounded in conservative philosophy. Hillsdale College junior Matthew McCorkle thought otherwise on the basis of Kirk’s Roots of American Order—“My impression is that Iraq doesn’t have those roots,” he said.

Are both readings equally valid? Students who delve deeper into Kirk’s life and work will find an answer. While he never openly dissented from the Cold War, Kirk left little doubt about his feelings toward more recent foreign-policy developments, saying at the time of the first Gulf War, “Not seldom has it seemed as if some eminent neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States.” Young conservatives who turn to George H. Nash’s Conservative Intellectual Movement in the United States Since 1945, meanwhile, will discover Kirk writing in a 1946 letter that “there is no tyranny more onerous than military life” and warning against perpetual war for perpetual peace.

No single work by Kirk or Weaver or even Robert Nisbet—whose last books, Conservatism: Dream and Reality and The Present Age are strongly anti-militaristic—makes a comprehensive case against preventive war and interventionism. A casual acquaintance with the conservative canon wouldn’t change any College Republican’s mind. But students who seek a fuller knowledge will find little in the conservative intellectual tradition that accords with George W. Bush’s view of the world and America’s place in it. Increasingly, conservatives over the age of 65—including George Will, Milton Friedman, Jeffrey Hart, and Bill Buckley himself—have come to see the Iraq War as folly. If students critically engage the works of the wisest men of an even older Right, they too may be forced to conclude that George W. Bush is no conservative all—or else that Kirk and Weaver, like James Lawrence, are really leftists.

Sunday, November 05, 2006



From The Chicago Sun-Times:

Election season is bad time for slip of the quip
BY MARK STEYN


My face time with John Kerry has been brief but choice. In 2003, I was at a campaign event in New Hampshire chatting with two old coots in plaid. The senator approached and stopped in front of us. The etiquette in primary season is that the candidate defers to the cranky Granite Stater's churlish indifference to status and initiates the conversation: "Hi, I'm John Kerry. Good to see ya. Cold enough for ya? How 'bout them Sox?" Etc. Instead, Kerry just stood there nose to nose, staring at us with an inscrutable semi-glare on his face. After an eternity, an aide stepped out from behind him and said, "The senator needs you to move."

"Well, why couldn't he have said that?" muttered one of the old coots. Why indeed?

Right now the Democratic Party needs the senator to move. Preferably to the South Sandwich Islands, until Tuesday evening, or better still, early 2009.

He won't, of course. A vain thin-skinned condescending blueblood with no sense of his own ridiculousness, Senator Nuancy Boy is secure in little else except his belief in his indispensability. We've all heard the famous "joke" now: "You know, education, if you make the most of it, you study hard, you do your homework and you make an effort to be smart, you can do well. And if you don't, you get stuck in Iraq." (Rimshot!) Yet, tempting as it is to enjoy his we-support-our-dumb-troops moment as merely the umpteenth confirmation of the senator's unerring ability to SwiftBoat himself, it belongs in a slightly different category of Kerry gaffe than, say, the time they went into Wendy's and Teresa didn't know what chili was.

Whatever he may or may not have intended (and "I was making a joke about how stupid Bush is but I'm the only condescending liberal in America too stupid to tell a Bush-is-stupid joke without blowing it" must rank as one of the all-time lame excuses), what he said fits what too many upscale Dems believe: that America's soldiers are only there because they're too poor and too ill-educated to know any better. That's what they mean when they say "we support our troops." They support them as victims, as children, as potential welfare recipients, but they don't support them as warriors and they don't support the mission.

So their "support" is objectively worthless. The indignant protest that "of course" "we support our troops" isn't support, it's a straddle, and one that emphasizes the Democrats' frivolousness in the post-9/11 world. A serious party would have seen the jihad as a profound foreign-policy challenge they needed to address credibly. They could have found a Tony Blair -- a big mushy-leftie pantywaist on health and education and all the other sissy stuff, but a man at ease with the projection of military force in the national interest. But we saw in Connecticut what happens to Democrats who run as Blairites: You get bounced from the ticket. In the 2004 election, instead of coming to terms with it as a national security question, the Democrats looked at the war on terror merely as a Bush wedge issue they needed to neutralize. And so they signed up with the weirdly incoherent narrative of John Kerry -- a celebrated anti-war activist suddenly "reporting for duty" as a war hero and claiming that, even though the war was a mistake and his comrades were murderers and rapists, his four months in the Mekong rank as the most epic chapter in the annals of the Republic.

It's worth contrasting the fawning media admiration for Kerry's truncated tour of duty with their total lack of interest in Bob Dole's years of service two presidential campaigns earlier. That convention night in Boston was one of the freakiest presentations in contemporary politics: a man being greeted as a combination of Alexander the Great and the Duke of Wellington for a few weeks' service in a war America lost. But Kerry is the flesh-and-blood embodiment of the Democratic straddle, of the we-oppose-the-war-but-support-our-troops line. That's why anti-war Dems, outspinning themselves, decided they could support a soldier who opposed a war. And as Kerry demonstrates effortlessly every time he opens his mouth, if you detach the heroism of a war from the morality of it, what's left but braggadocio? Or, as the senator intoned to me back in New Hampshire when I tried to ask what he would actually do about Iraq, Iran or anything else, "Sometimes truly courageous leadership means having the courage not to show any leadership." (I quote from memory.)

In fairness to Kerry, he didn't invent the Democrats' tortured relationship with the military. But ever since Eugene McCarthy ran against Lyndon Johnson and destroyed the most powerful Democrat of the last half-century, the Democratic Party has had a problematic relationship with the projection of power in the national interest. President Jimmy Carter confined himself to one screwed-up helicopter mission in Iran; Bill Clinton bombed more countries in a little more than six months than the Zionist neocon warmonger Bush has in six years but, unless you happened to be in that Sudanese aspirin factory, it was as desultory and uncommitted as his sex life and characterized by the same inability to reach (in Ken Starr's word) "completion." As for John Kerry, since he first slandered the American military three decades ago, he's been wrong on every foreign policy question and voted against every significant American weapons system.

To be sure, like Kerry in 2004 deciding that the murderers and rapists were now his brave "band of brothers," the left often discover a sudden enthusiasm for the previous war once a new one's come along. Since Iraq, they've been all in favor of Afghanistan, though back in the fall of 2001 they were convinced it was a quagmire, graveyard of empire, unwinnable, another Vietnam, etc. Oh, and they also discovered a belated enthusiasm for the first President Bush's shrewd conduct of the 1991 Gulf War, though at the time Kerry and most other Democrats voted against that one, too. In this tedious shell game, no matter how frantically the left shuffles the cups, you never find the one shriveled pea of The Military Intervention We're Willing To Support When it Matters.

To be sure, the progressives deserve credit for having refined their view of the military: not murderers and rapists, just impoverished suckers too stupid for anything other than soldiering. The left still doesn't understand that it's the soldier who guarantees every other profession -- the defeatist New York Times journalist, the anti-American college professor, the insurgent-video-of-the-day host at CNN, the hollow preening blowhard senator. Kerry's gaffe isn't about one maladroit Marie Antoinette of the Senate but a glimpse into the mind-set of too many Americans.

©Mark Steyn, 2006



Big Time Football
On the Carolina loss to Notre Dame.
By Adam Lucas


SOUTH BEND--This can't be Big Time Football.

That's why Carolina made the 90-minute flight north to South Bend, right? They were in search of Big Time Football. Not just big time football.

Big. Time. Football.

But there wasn't a video board to be found inside Notre Dame Stadium. The scoreboards only had room for down, distance, and the time left in the quarter.

Fans in the stands sat on weathered wooden bleachers with no backs and the seat numbers stenciled on in plain white paint.

Where were the contests? Where was the buzz? Where were the laser lights and fireworks and clowns jumping out of Volkswagens?

Speaking of that, where was the traffic?

Coming into town two hours before the game, there were hardly any cars on the road. You zipped into South Bend on Angela Blvd., past the house with the sign in the yard that read, "Bathrooms $5.00," went straight through a stoplight, and there was Touchdown Jesus summoning you to the parking lot.

Which is about the time you realized why there wasn't any traffic: everyone was already at the game.

Two hours early.

Big Time Football does not just happen for a few hours on a Saturday afternoon. It happens all day, starting at daybreak. This is what it says on the back of the Notre Dame parking passes:

"Spots can not be guaranteed less than 90 minutes before kickoff."

Huh?

You can be cynical and you can hate Rudy, but it was almost impossible not to get a little tingle when the Notre Dame band lined up and those gold helmets and navy jerseys ran out of the tunnel. Maybe they get too much credit in national polls and maybe they get too much hype on ESPN and maybe they're on the cover of Sports Illustrated too often (the 12 covers framed in the press box are impressive...until you realize that's just the first dozen covers)--by the way, every other program in the country would love to be complained about in the same way, kind of like Carolina in basketball--but the history seeps out of every corner of the stadium.

Structurally, the stadium itself is not as physically imposing as Clemson or Florida State. Get a wide view from the press box and the extremely narrow sidelines (purposely designed by Knute Rockne to be narrow to try and eliminate "unnecessary visitors," a quest that evidently didn't work based on the drift on the sidelines) make the stadium appear tiny.

Let Death Valley be the equivalent of Yankee Stadium. Notre Dame Stadium is content to be Wrigley Field.

Wrigley has a feel. South Bend has that same feel. It doesn't need fancy electronics or jazzy introductions. It has history, and it simply waits for you to be overwhelmed by it. Carolina players noticed it during their walk-through on Friday, when several of them couldn't resist snapping photos and, for a couple minutes, acting like tourists.

It is hard to be a tourist and still compete in Big Time Football. Down 31-13 at halftime, it looked like the Tar Heels were content to play the role of friendly visitor. But Hakeem Nicks comes from Charlotte Independence, the scaled down high school version of Notre Dame that loses even less frequently than the Gipper. So he knew about Big Time Football.

And he played it throughout the second half, hauling in a pair of touchdown passes and breaking the Carolina single-game freshman receiving record with 171 yards. The last of the half-dozen receptions was a 72-yard touchdown that brought the Tar Heels within 38-26 with 7:25 left in the third quarter.

Suddenly, this was a winnable game.

That's about the time Carolina imploded. With Notre Dame at the UNC 20 and a first-and-10, Brady Quinn scrambled for 4 yards. A flag went down during the run; the Irish were going to be penalized for holding, pushing them out of the red zone and setting up the Carolina defense to try and improve on their game total of three sacks.

But Durell Mapp hit Quinn out of bounds, and then the Heels were whistled for a painful second personal foul penalty as the Notre Dame sideline enveloped Mapp.

Those were just two of the five personal foul penalties whistled on the Tar Heels during a disappointing fourth quarter that saw them go from competitive to combative. The Irish cleared their bench midway through the final period and cruised to the 45-26 final margin.

After the final play, after the final Notre Dame student had been tossed up in the air to celebrate a score (apparently a school tradition), after the leprechaun had danced his peculiar jig for the last time, every player gathered in the corner in front of the student section. They threw their arms over the shoulders of their teammates and began to sway, singing along to the alma mater with the rest of the student body.

Through the windows of the press box, it wasn't quite possible to make out the tune. But it was easy to discern the message:

Big Time Football.